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This article examines how gender analogies are used by disability scholars to
gain credibility for claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. By
devoting analytic attention to the complicated nature of the disability-gender
analogy, this article details the benefits of such analogies as well as their
limitations. "Common sense" assumptions about gender help explain why
certain sex discrimination claims fail under Title VII. An exploration of this
dynamic will help shed light on the nature of institutional barriers to disability
rights claims under the ADA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Claims to equal justice under the law are complicated. It is a difficult task to
build such claims because dynamics of inequality are themselves complex. For
those who do not experience inequality, the dynamics of privilege and
disadvantage are often difficult to recognize. And for those who do experience it,
it is often difficult to translate a critique of inequality into a persuasive legal
argument for a remedy.
The need to examine the complicated nature of claims to equal justice may be
particularly acute for claims made by people with disabilities. Within the fast
growing legal literature on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),1 several
lawyer-activists have argued that federal courts have largely departed from the
legislative history and original intent in their interpretations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 19732 and the ADA.3 A more recent wave of literature criticizes various
* Associate Professor of Sociology and Government & Politics, University of Texas at
Dallas. Special thanks to Doug Dow for his comments and advice.
** Professor of Sociology and Government & Politics, University of Texas at Dallas.
142 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected
Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 107 (1997); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As"
Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL L. REV. 587 (1997); Wendy Wilkinson,
Judicially Crafled Barriers to Bringing Suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S.
TEx. L. Ray. 907 (1997).
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1999 Supreme Court cases4 for similar reasons and terms these cases "judicial
backlash." 5
This article focuses on legal discourse on disability in a different way. Rather
than focusing on court decisions, this article begins a sociological examination of
the academic legal literature on disability.6 This means treating the legal academic
scholarship on disability as a form of work-with cognitive habits, institutional
contexts, and modes of persuasion-and asking questions about the processes of
construction and persuasion entailed in the production of institutional legal
knowledge about disability and the ADA. A sociology of legal knowledge,
developed by Pamela Brandwein in another context,7 can be fruitfully applied
here, if only in the most preliminary way.
A sociological investigation of legal scholarship on disability might seem
unusual to readers of law reviews and perhaps a bit disconcerting. It is easy for
participants in scholarly debates to forget that they are contributors to a particular
discourse. Debaters most certainly understand themselves as proponents of a
"more true" thesis. However tempting it is to think that we need sociological
studies of only bad knowledge claims, we should remember that the arguments
we find persuasive and credible are contingent and subject to institutional forces
as well. By viewing the knowledge claims of lawyer-activists as structured
institutional practices, this article hopes to foster reflexive thinking about the
production of legal scholarship on disability.
More specifically, this article examines the use of gender analogies as a
strategy to gain credibility for various definitions of legal equality for people with
disabilities. This article also participates in the practice of writing an extended
analogy of disability to gender. A noticeable characteristic of disability-gender
analogies is that the types of sex discrimination claims that succeed institutionally
tend to get more attention than the types that fail. This article argues, for a variety
of reasons, that it is critical to devote more analytical attention to the types of sex
discrimination claims that fail.
4 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against
the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
Berkeley J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating
Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EM. & LAB.
L. 53 (2000).
6 Pamela Brandwein develops ways of studying academic legal literatures in Disciplinary
Structures and "Winning" Arguments in Law and Courls Scholarship, 10 LAw AND COURTS,
Summer 2000 (American Political Science Assoc., Washington, D.C.), at 11-19.
7 PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCING RECONSTRUCrION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999) (examining the history of the canonical
treatment of Fourteenth Amendment history by legal scholars and judges, including how this
version survived even after it has been called into question by other scholarship).
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One type of sex discrimination claim that fails is illustrated by EEOC v.
Sears.8 This case illuminates what is likely to be an institutional obstacle to
claims for reasonable accommodation. This well-known "lack of interest" case
and the analysis of it by legal scholar Vicki Schultz9 is a focus infra.10 A
discussion of Sears is useful strategically and is in line with recent work by
Matthew Diller, who has called attention to cultural and legal obstacles to
reasonable accommodation claims.1 I While extended attention has already been
paid to the persistence of medical models of disability,12 this article hopes to shed
some light on some additional obstacles.
While this article focuses on the use of gender analogies in the production of
legal arguments about disability discrimination, it does not examine the success of
these analogies in gaining credibility for disability rights claims. It would be
difficult to isolate and assess the impact of these gender analogies, and such an
assessment extends beyond the scope of a single article. An assessment, however,
would be part of a larger sociological project that maps both the production and
institutional reception of legal arguments.
II. THE ANALOGY OF DIsABILITY TO GENDER
A. The Disability Discrimination Literature
It makes sense to draw analogies to gender as a strategy to persuade others of
the legitimacy of disability rights claims. It makes sense because "we learn by
importing understandings from one context to another .... [1]nsights about one
area of difference may be relevant and instructive to other areas of difference." 13
Indeed, law often proceeds by analogy.
Many prominent writers in disability literature make analogies to gender.
Robert Burgdorf comments that "[t]he history of gender discrimination in this
country counsels that it can be very harmful to be deemed 'special." 14 Anita
8 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
9 Vicki Schultz, Women Before the Law: Judicial Stories About Women, Work and Sex,
Segregation in the Job, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLrICAL (Judith Butler & Joan Scott, eds.
1992).
10 See infra Section l1.D.
I ISee Diller, supra note 5, at 44. ("[P]eople with disabilities find themselves on the front
lines of a legal and cultural war.").
12 Seesupra notes 3 and 5.
13 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 308 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1993).
14 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 568.
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Silvers refers to the "striking resemblance in how the general culture has operated
to debar both women and people with disabilities from flourishing."'15 She states:
[There is] a history of being marginali[z]ed by group identities which have operated
to mark group members as weak and incompetent.... Despite having progressively
liberated themselves from their former legal subordination, women still are
disadvantaged by physical and social environments arranged to favour the physical
and social preferences of men, as are people with disabilities .... As additional
evidence of commonality, observe that our workplace practice has not fully advanced
beyond imagining being pregnant, an element of the life plans of many women but no
men, to be a disability.16
Authors have also noted certain limitations of the gender analogy. Silvers
makes it a point to distinguish the situations of women with and without
disabilities. Women with disabilities are "excused or disallowed from being cast
in [the] roles [of nurturer and sexual being]."'1 7 In addition, "the social
construction of women with disabilities commonly prevents women with
disabilities from even assuming these roles. '18
There are, of course, other limits to the gender analogy. For example, women
have not been subject to forced segregation. Sex segregation in the labor force
certainly exists, but it is a different kind of segregation.19
Gender analogies are often made in the same breath with race analogies.
Matthew Diller states, "Both the rhetoric and structure of the ADA are... based
on an implicit analogy between the problems facing people with disabilities and
those faced by women and racial minorities."20 Robert Burgdorf compares the
exclusion of people with disabilities to exclusions based on race, gender, and
religion. Such channeling is "reminiscent of race, gender, and religious
discrimination in that it involves an overreaction by others to a particular
characteristic of an individual, i.e., prejudice."21
A careful delineation of similarities and differences among race, gender,
religion, and disability would promise a more comprehensive analysis of
inequality, generally while making more effective use of such analogies for
disability rights claims in particular. An examination of race and religion
15 Anita Silvers, Double Consciousness, Triple Difference: Disability, Race, Gender, and
the Politics of Recognition, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILrIY AND LEGAL CHANGE 85 (Melinda
Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999).
16Id. at 84.
17Id. at 88.
18Id at 81.
19 See NANCY FoLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS: GENDER AND THE STRUCIrJRES OF
CONSTRAINT 91-125 (1994) (discussing the complex historical origins of sex segregation in the
labor force).
20 Diller, supra note 5, at 32.
21 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 517.
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analogies, however, takes us beyond the scope of this Article and that will have to
wait for another day.
The main point here is that the gender analogy is often more complicated
than authors allow. Indeed, Diller's comment about the successful adaptation of
the civil rights model to gender issues22 is too simple and this is addressed in
greater detail below.
In making a gender-disability comparison, Burgdorf offers contradictory
assessments of whether things are "working" under sex discrimination law as
compared to disability discrimination law. In his analysis of Hatfield v. Quantum
Chemical Corp.,23 Burgdorf states:
If this were a case of race, religion or gender discrimination, the court would not
focus on the relative darkness or lightness of the plaintiff's skin, how religious the
plaintiff was [or] how feminine or masculine the plaintiff was... or any
nondiscrimination law, this would be a strange set of affairs.24
In fact, it is not a strange set of affairs under sex discrimination law. Sexual
harassment law is replete with such examples.25 Indeed, Burgdorf makes gender
an exception. He states that the intense focus on ADA plaintiffs is similar to the
focus on alleged victims in rape trials where "the alleged victim is often on trial
rather than the alleged perpetrator. ' 26 This sort of sporadic insight into similarities
between gender and disability discrimination law, coupled with over-
generalization about the nature of sex discrimination law, makes a gender-
disability comparison ripe for analysis. Such a comparison could aid the
advancement of both kinds of claims, as well as contribute to a broader critique of
discrimination law generally.
22 See Diller, supra note 5, at 39.
23 920 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1996). In this case, a male supervisor directed Hatfield, his
male employee, to engage in oral sex with him and on some occasions "summoned [him] by
calling him 'pussy."' Hatfield entered into therapy and claimed to be unable to work under this
supervisor. Hatfield requested a transfer to another supervisor. When this request was refused,
Hatfield brought a disability claim under the ADA for the employer's failure to provide
reasonable accommodation. The court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding
that Hatfield was not disabled and therefore not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.
24 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 560-61.
2 5 See Susan Estrich, Sex and Work; 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991); see also Pamela
Brandwein, "Sexual Harassment and the Legal System, "in ANALYZING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 98
(Dana Dunn & David W. Waller, eds., 2d ed. 2000).
26 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 561.
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B. An Overall Pattern in Sex Discrimination Law?
Before examining the Sears case, it is important to provide a brief look at the
various patterns in sex discrimination cases. This is useful because there might be
an analogy between an early line of anti-stereotyping sex discrimination cases in
the 1970s2 7 and a recent line of circuit court cases on disability discrimination.2 8
In these cases, courts interpreted the third prong of the definition of disability-
the "regarded as" prong-in the Rehabilitation Act of 197329 and the ADA.3 °
Both groups of cases are marked by an emergent recognition of capacity and
ability to do certain kinds of work.
But "common sense" still considers women and men differently. This
difference lies in women's perceived inability to do certain jobs, such as a combat
soldier31 or a prison guard in contact positions in a maximum-security prison,32
and in their perceived lack of interest in certain jobs.33 This "common sense"
gender difference is analogous to "common sense" differences between people
with and without disabilities.
There is no simple pattern of court response to sex discrimination claims. In
fact, courts have provided no coherent yardstick-theoretical or otherwise-for
deciding when gender classifications may be used and when they may not. A
statute that grants female officers two more years than men to gain promotion in
the Navy's up-or-out policy is permissible.34 A Social Security Act provision that
27 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding an Idaho statute preferring men as
executors of estates unconstitutional); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding
military laws automatically giving spousal benefits to married men but denying them to married
women absent a showing that the wife provided more than half the husband's support
unconstitutional); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding an Alabama statute exempting
women from alimony obligation unconstitutional).
28 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding an individual may
be both "handicapped" and "otherwise qualified" for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act);
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that determining whether an
individual is disabled must be made on an individual bases and is a question for the jury);
Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a disability includes
"being regarded as having a substantial limiting impairment); Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 1993) (holding whether a plaintiff had a physical impairment was a question for the
jury).
29 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. IV. 1998).
30 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
31 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
32 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
3 3 Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority's holding establishes that racial or sexual discrimination
is permitted under Title VII when it is intended to overcome the effect of society's
attitudes which limits the entry of protected classes into certain jobs).
34 Schlessinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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gives women an advantage in calculating base period income by being able to
exclude three more low-earning years is permissible.35 A Florida statute that
gives widows, but not widowers, the benefit of a $500 annual property tax
exemption is permissible.36
The classifications at issue in the above cases, in the Court's view, do not run
aground of its anti-stereotyping rule. However, classifications in other cases do.
For example, a Social Security provision awarding a widow automatic benefits
based on the earnings history of her dead husband, but allowing a widower such
benefits only if he shows he received at least half his support from his dead wife
is not permissible.37 An Oklahoma statute that prohibits the sale of 3.2% beer to
males under the age of 21, and to females under the age of 18 is not permissible. 38
It is critical to figure out what it is about a sex discrimination claim that leads
courts to choose either the anti-differentiation mode 39 or the "common sense"
difference model. Sears is the exemplar case of this latter model. There is also the
anti-subordination approach seen in Schlessinger, Califano, and Kahn, that is
concerned with ameliorating the effects of prior disadvantages. With regard to
affirmative action claims, the anti-differentiation model has been dominant since
City ofRichmond v. J. Croson Co.40 was decided in 1989.
It is important for both analytical and strategical reasons to determine what
influences court choices in both sex and disability discrimination claims. But it is
clear, at least in the context of sex discrimination claims, that courts can
simultaneously use anti-stereotyping rules and "common sense" assumptions
about differences. A comprehensive critique of court reasoning about
discrimination, including disability discrimination, requires building a picture
about the types of social relationships and fact situations that influence a court's
approach to a civil rights claim.
35 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
36 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
37 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
38 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
39 Ruth Colker identifies two different principles that underlie the equal protection
doctrine: the principle of anti-differentiation and the principle of anti-subordination. While the
anti-differentiation principle equates the harm of all classificatory distinctions (e.g., Jim Crow
and set-aside programs), the anti-subordination principle is not hostile to race and gender
classificatory distinctions that ameliorate inequality. See Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination
Principle: Applications, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1987), reprinted in, FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 288 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993): "[I]t is often the principle of anti-
differentiation [that underlies equal protection doctrine]. The anti-differentiation principle seeks
a color blind and sex blind society where racial and sexual differentiations do not exist." Colker
discusses equal protection jurisprudence and the anti-differentiation model in the context of
disability-based discrimination in Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv.
653 (2000).
40 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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C. Contributions of 1980s Feminist Theory
Feminist theory from the 1980s pays extensive attention to the "difference
dilemma." On the one hand, if legislatures take actual differences, such as
pregnancy, into account, these classifications risk reinforcing the stereotype that
women need special protection because they are weaker. On the other hand, if
legislatures do not take differences into account in a world that disadvantages
those differences, the negative impact of differences may be reinforced.
In 1966, a famous law review article by Tussman and tenBroek articulated
the idea that those "similarly situated" must be given the same treatment 4 1 The
legal mandate of equal treatment became a matter of treating likes alike and
unlikes unlike. Such an interpretation was not necessary because this was not the
only way of interpreting a legal mandate of equal treatment. Writing in 1987
about gender inequality, Catherine MacKinnon stated, "Doctrinally speaking,
gender is socially constructed as difference epistemologically; sex discrimination
law bounds gender equality by difference doctrinally... the deepest problems of
sex inequality will not find women 'similarly situated' to men." 42 The same can
be said about disability.
Critical for the purposes here are feminist explications of how constructions
of "difference" are built on taken-for-granted assumptions. Courts have generally
remained blind to MacKinnon's point that to treat issues of sex equality as issues
of sameness and difference is to take a particular approach:
Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things.
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our correspondence
with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. Under the difference
standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence with him, our
womanhood judged by our distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus
simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female
standard.4 3
Academics articulating a socio-political model of disability argue in similar
fashion.44 Constructed social environments consist of architecture, attitudes,
behaviors, and institutional rules and practices. These characteristics reflect
assumptions about what constitutes "normal" human function. The dynamics that
41 Joseph Tusmann & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL L.
REV. 341,344-53 (1949).
4 2 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW,
32-33,44 (1987).
4 3 Id. at34.
44 See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability Definitions, Disciplines, and
Policies, 22 Soc. Sci. J. 87 (1985).
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support such assumptions are often not recognizable to people holding traditional
definitions of power 4 5
Thus, if dynamics of inequality actually create both perceived and actual
differences among social groups, claims to legal equality can be difficult to win,
given the "similarly situated" model. If courts tend to think of equality as
equivalence, not distinction, the differences created by relations of hierarchy and
power will render "equal (literally the same) laws" sometimes, but not always,
helpful. Careful distinctions between "equal" laws and "identical" laws must be
made. Thus, contributors to the disability discrimination literature often contrast
laws that protect all people from exclusionary stereotypes and laws that require all
people to use the stairs.
MacKinnon has proposed an alternative approach to the difference dilemma.
"In this approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of
power."46 The distribution of power would thus provide a yardstick for deciding
when gender classifications are acceptable and when they are not. But it is
doubtful MacKinnon would trust courts with such an assessment. It is also
problematic to assume that objective determinations can always be made about
whether particular legal classifications promote women's subordination or male
power. Pornography is just one example of disagreement among feminists about
subordinating practices 47 While disagreement is likely about the kinds of
practices that subordinate people with disabilities, this might be a fruitful avenue
of discussion.
D. EEOC v. Sears and the Gendered Jobs Analogy
This section examines the Sears case in order to caution against undue
optimism when using litigation strategies to seek extensive accommodations.
Sears is a sobering example of deep institutional entrenchment of baseline
assumptions about the nature ofjobs, even in the face of disconfirming facts.
In the 1970s, the Court handed down a number of decisions that used anti-
stereotyping rules. Cultural thinking about gender---"common sense" about
women and men-had changed enough so that certain gender stereotypes became
disfavored, such as the notion that men were more capable of handling business
matters, even while others remained largely undisturbed. The view that traditional
women would want to work only in traditionally female jobs is one example.
When the Supreme Court ruled in Reed that legislatures could not enact a statute
4 5 Traditional definitions of power emphasize a conscious intent or will to achieve an
outcome or specific effect. Though they have concrete effects on the distribution of benefits and
resources, the operations of taken-for-granted belief systems are not intentional or willful in this
sense.
46 MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 40.
47 Compare, ag., MACKINNON, supra note 42, with, NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
containing a preference for men as executors,48 it was clear to the Justices that
women could do the job. The Court now perceived erroneous beliefs and
stereotypes where earlier it had not. However, harder-to-see dynamics of social
construction were still at work culturally.
Anita Silver's examination of the Sears case reveals the kinds of resistance
likely to be faced by certain kinds of legal claims generating from the social
model of disability.49 This model sees the primary problem faced by people with
disabilities as one that is extemal to them. Architecture, workplaces, and
institutional practices have been constructed using baseline assumptions about the
"normal" user. This model admits that individual impairment is a factor in
understanding the predicaments/situations of people with disabilities. What
matters is the relationship between an individual's impairment and the nature of
the environment in which the individual must function. Burgdorf, too, emphasizes
the role of context in imposing limitations.5 0
In Sears, 61% of all.applicants for sales jobs were women, but they only
constituted between 5.3 and 10.5% of those hired in commission sales.51 Men
were twice as likely to be hired into commission sales, after adjusting for
differences in qualifications. The EEOC charged that the low percentage of
women in commission sales was a result of discrimination by Sears. Sears argued
that (1) commission sales intrinsically required the masculine traits selected for in
the Active & Vigor test;52 (2) women had an intrinsic feminine and family
48 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
4 9 Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DisABILrrY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICs AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 75 (Anita Silvers, et at eds.,
1998).
The social model of disability transforms the notion of 'handicapping condition' from a state of
a minority of people, which disadvantages them in society, to a state of society, which
disadvantages a minority of people. The social model traces the source of this minority's
disadvantage to a hostile environment and treats the dysfunction attendant on (certain kinds of)
impairment as artificial and remediable, not natural and immutable.
Id. See also Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
50 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 522 ("A person may perform some mental or physical
function in a way that falls short of most other people, but the limitations imposed upon that
individual frequently result as much from the social context as from the impaired function
itself.") (citation omitted).
51 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302,321 (7th Cir. 1988).
52 Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUDIS 375
(1986). The test asked, "Do you have a low-pitched voice?" "Do you swear often?" "Have you
ever done any hunting?" "Have you played on a football team?" In screening applicants to sales
positions, Sears also used a manual titled the "Big Ticket Salesman," describing commission
salespeople as liking tools (even though draperies were among those things sold by
commission), having considerable physical vigor, and liking work that requires physical energy.
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orientation and had a lack of interest in these jobs; and (3) Sears had made
enormous efforts to recruit women but could not get women interested.5 3
The Court accepted the lack-of-interest argument. The Court took a
traditional perspective in assuming workers to be fully formed in their job
aspirations, in their leadership styles, and in their attitudes before they reach the
workplace.54 The Court also took Sears' job description as objective and
accurately defining the traits needed to do the job.55
Schultz develops an account of gender and work that "traces gendered work
attitudes and behaviors to organizational structures and cultures in the
workplace." 56 "It is not enough," she states, "to provide women formal labor
market opportunities because deeper aspects of organizational life provide
powerful disincentives for women to aspire and succeed in nontraditional
employment."57 Schultz also cites an array of research to support this
conclusion,58 including work that examined the effects of "masculine" job
descriptions on women's choices to pursue such jobs.59 When a telephone
lineman's job was presented to women in masculine terms, 5% of the women in
the study expressed interest. When the job was presented in gender-neutral terms,
25% expressed interest. When the job was written to appeal to women, 45%
expressed interest.60
Lessons about the importance of job descriptions can be applied to the Sears
case. Here, the Court did not recognize that Sears had a choice in presenting the
job in made terms and images. It is certainly possible, after all, to describe
commission sales work in gender-neutral terms, emphasizing such traits as
communication skills, friendliness, product knowledge, etc. More neutral
descriptions might easily have stimulated greater interest on the part of female
applicants.
Schultz also discusses the judicial belief that traditional women will only be
interested in traditionally female work. She cites a major study conducted by
Mary Walshok of women in blue-collar trades.6 ' Walshok found that traditional
women, with no prior interest in or knowledge about the trades, became
committed to the trades after they started working in these jobs. Many had contact
with community-based programs designed to attract women into the trades, while
53 Sears, 839 F.2d at 319-24.
54 Id. at 320-24
55 Ia at 319-20
56 Schultz, supra note 9, at 311.
57 1d.
58 1d. at 310, 320-21.
5 9 Sandra L. Bern & Daryl J. B ern, Does Sex-Biased Job Advertising "Aid and Abet" Sex
Discrimination, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 6 (1973), cited in Schultz, supra note 9, at 310.
6 0 Id. at 332 n.59.
6 1 MARY LINDENSTEIN WALSHOK, BLUE-CoLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE
FRONTER, 137-38 (1981), cited in Schultz, supra note 9, at 313.
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others had heard trade organizations were looking for women. Only when these
women started working in these jobs did they come to define this work as a
central interest and source of identity.62
Finally, Schultz cites findings that women's job preferences are not
necessarily fixed.63 That is, their job preferences can change over time after they
begin working. Also, women in non-traditional jobs often begin their work
histories in traditional jobs. Interestingly, the likelihood that a woman will change
the sex-type of her occupation is unaffected by marital status, family
responsibilities, age, or race.
To rebut the assumption that women have traits that suited them for slower,
less competitive, and more social jobs, Schultz cites a series of studies in the
1950s that looked at men in low-mobility jobs. These studies found that men in
dead-end jobs lowered their work aspirations, looked for satisfaction elsewhere,
came to define work as secondary in their lives, and valued extrinsic features of
the job, such as friends, rather than its intrinsic features.64 Conventional
stereotypes tend to attribute these sorts of attitudes and behaviors to women,
representing women as naturally this way, without recognizing that low-mobility
jobs can actually produce such traits and behaviors. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's
famous study of corporate secretaries makes this same point.65
Thus, judicial assumptions about the nature of the workplace, like the
commission sales job description and women's job preferences, were rooted in
cultural ideology. They could not believe the possibility that a workplace,
structured to hang a "not welcome" sign for women, could be restructured in a
more gender-neutral way.
Regarding the Sears case, it is clear to many in academia that women could
do the job and would choose to pursue such jobs if they were framed in less
masculine terms. In making the analogy to disability, it is often the case that ajob
might be structured somewhat differently so that persons with disabilities might
pursue such jobs. In pushing for such restructuring, the fight will be with
"common sense" ideas about the capacities of people with disabilities, since that
common sense will underestimate those abilities- probably for a long time to
come. Of course, it is possible that certain jobs can be restructured only so far, or
not at all, resulting in an unavoidable exclusion. Separating these sorts of cases
from those in which reasonable accommodations can be made is necessary. Such
categorizations will likely be contested, especially when significant cost is
attached.
62 Id.
63 Schultz, supra note 9, at 312
64 Schultz, supra note 9, at 315.
6 5 See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
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II. CouRTS, THE CONSTRUCTED ENVIRONMENT, AND
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Perhaps the worries stemming from Sears are misplaced. Both Silvers and
Burgdorf cite elements of the legal landscape that seem to indicate that
congressional and judicial understandings of equality are responsive to difference
based on disability.
Silvers believes the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968,66 the Air Carriers
Access Act of 1986,67 and Lloyd v. Regional Transportation AuthoriVA8
exemplify the responsiveness of public officials to differences based upon
disability.69 She cites Lloyd in a philosophical essay that examines the usefulness
of a politics of recognition for people with disabilities. In the course of arguing
that responsiveness to difference is necessary and does not entail the privileging
of any group's perspective, Silvers offers a concrete example drawn from legal
doctrine. "Recent U.S. civil rights history illustrates that, to be meaningful,
equality must be responsive to difference." 70 As evidence, she refers to Lloyd, a
circuit court case which held that public transportation systems have an
affirmative duty to provide wheelchair lifts.71 However, while Lloyd is certainly
part of case law, it is not representative of recent civil rights history in which a
post-Croson72 formalism-the anti-differentiation model requiring sameness of
treatment-has become dominant. Diller's concern about the current dominance
of post-Croson formalism remains relevant.
Robert Burgdorf argues that the Supreme Court has already approved the
concept of reasonable accommodation, citing a footnote from Alexander v.
Choate.73 Burgdorf states, "The Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable
66 42 U.S.C. § 4151-4156 (1994).
67 49 U.S.C. §1301 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended by General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994,49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Silvers cites the 1986 Air Carriers
Act as legislation related to the ADA which "offers added insight into the discrimination against
disability that must be arrested if the disabled are to increase their social participation." Anita
Silvers, Disability Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICs 781, 790 (Ruth Chadwick ed.
1998). See also Silvers, supra note 49, at 125.
68 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
69 See Silvers, supra note 49, at 118.
70 Silvers, supra note 49, at 78.
7 1 Lloyd, 548 F.2d at 1284.
72 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a city's
requirement that all contractors awarded a city construction contract must subcontract to one or
more minority owned businesses was not narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination and
that city failed to show a compelling government interest to justify the plan).
73 469 U.S. 287,300-01 n.20 (1985).
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accommodation 'relates to the elimination of existing obstacles' against
[individuals with disabilities]." 74
The Choate footnote was an attempt to clarify affirmative action language
used in an earlier Rehabilitation Act case, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.75 In the Choate footnote, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
responded to criticism of the use of affirmative action language in Davis. Justice
Marshall wrote:
Regardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it is clear from the context
of Davis that the term "affirmative action" referred to those "changes," "adjustments,"
or '"modifications" to existing programs that would be "substantial," or that would
constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a program. . ." rather than to
those changes that would be reasonable accommodations.76
In the previous footnote, Justice Marshall stated, "the ultimate question is the
extent to which a grantee [of federal funds] is required to make reasonable
modifications in its programs for the needs of the handicapped." 77
Thus, it would appear from Choate that the Court distinguished affirmative
action from reasonable accommodation. However, Choate does not establish this
distinction definitively. Contrary to Marshall's assertion, it is not clear in Davis
that the term "affirmative action" applies only to changes that are substantial and
fundamental, and not just reasonable.7 8 More importantly, Choate is a 1985 case
occurring before Croson. It would be a more reliable indicator if it had been
decided after the solidification of the five-member Court majority consisting of
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor that favors Croson
formalism.
Of course, even if the Supreme Court regards reasonable accommodation to
be within the boundaries of its formalism, the Court's definition of what counts as
reasonable accommodation will likely remain contested. That is, the Court's
74 Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 530. Burgdorf also cites School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987) ("Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a
reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee.").
75 Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Davis involved section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 wherein Justice Powell wrote an opinion for a unanimous Court
frequently using the language of affirmative conduct and affirmative action. He used this
language in discussing the question of whether Southeastern was required under section 504 to
modify their program to permit participation by the plaintiff and disabled people generally.
Justice Powell stated, "situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program
might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a
refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the
handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of HEW." Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13.
76 Choate, 469 U.S. at 300-01, n.20 (citations omitted).
77 Id. at 299, n.19.
7 8Davis, 442 U.S. at 409-12.
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conceptual foundation for reasonable accommodation might very well fall short
of the conceptual foundation built by disability activists.79 In other words,
disability activists might be successful in claiming the need for reasonable
accommodation, but perhaps not on the basis of equal rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This last point is especially important.
As previously mentioned, Matthew Diller forecasts an inhospitable legal
context for claims to reasonable accommodation because the formalism of the
current Court will lead them to see reasonable accommodations as "different
treatment," a violation of the anti-differentiation model. Diller states:
[T]he ADA relies on notions of equality that have proven to be especially
controversial. The ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation rests on the
idea that in some circumstances, people must be treated differently from others in
order to be treated equally. This "different treatment" form of equality has long been
contested and in the context of affirmative action has met with deep resistance from
the courts.80
IV. CONCLUSION
There are, certainly, many specific legal questions of definition raised by the
Americans with Disabilities Act and its interpretation by the courts. However, at
least some of the disagreement over the meaning of the ADA can be traced to
differing fundamental assumptions about the nature of equal treatment and the
application of this concept to situations where people with disabilities are
excluded from employment, public accommodation, and civic participation. All
too often, parallels among different forms of discrimination are asserted or
assumed without a close examination of legal and broader cultural interpretations
of the meanings of disability and gender. As this article has discussed, a more
careful examination of gender analogies to disability, as well as a more
comprehensive understanding of the contested points in anti-discrimination law,
may reveal points of similarity and difference across these categories.
It may be politically advantageous to build support for simple policy
statements of nondiscrimination and to emphasize the equivalence of practices
that exclude persons from participation because of gender and disability.
Ultimately, disability law may require something more than the ADA. In order to
determine what is needed, we first must achieve a better understanding of how
specific legal discourses about equality and fairness are associated with specific
policy outcomes. Comparing anti-discrimination policies related to gender and
disability is an important first step in this inquiry.
7 9 See Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 513-36. Burgdorf argues that the courts have largely
misunderstood the conceptual foundations and underlying principles of disability
nondiscrimination laws.
80 Diller, supra note 5, at 23.
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